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templated 'legislative enactment on prior statutes cannot be
doubted.28 But raising a potential constitutional .objection to
amendments by implication presents almost insurmountable bar-
riers to effective legislative action,24 particularly in a civil law
jurisdiction where the vast majority of litigation involves re-
course to legislative enactment. No judge or lawyer, and few lay-
men, need be told that virtually every statute changes prior
law.215 Bringing all change which does not amount to repeal
within the scope of the constitutional provision will make compli-
ance with the mandate a practical impossibility in many situa-
tions.
A thorough judicial reconsideration of the constitutionality
of amendments by implication with a more complete analysis of
the legal and practical problems involved is imperative. Certainly
some clear statement concerning if, when, and to what extent
amendment by implication is permissible is indispensable to ef-
fective legislative action at the approaching session.
A.B.R.
SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' CIVIL RELIEF ACT-EVICTION OF SOL-
DIERS' BUSINESS FROM COMMERCIAL PREMISES-Action was brought
to evict Streiffer from his leased business premises on the ground
that he handled and sold children's wear and hardware in viola-
23. The problem of giving notoriety to the substance of the proposed
change has received attention. See Horack, Cases and Materials on Legisla-
tion (1940) 657. Generally accepted methods adopt various means of bringing
changes to the legislator's attention on final printing of a proposed bill and
to the attention of the public in the official publication of the statute passed.
Among the methods adopted: (1) Deleted matter is printed in brackets and a
line drawn through it. New matter is italicized. Upon final publication, the
italics remain and omissions are indicated by asterisks. (2) Excised matter
Is published in brackets. (3) Changes are indicated in footnotes. (4) Blind
amendment is used but the act as amended is also published in full. See
Note (1931) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1143, 1146. These methods are helpful, so far as
they go. But are they not, in substance, rather inadequate attempts to deal
with the more fundamental problem of achieving skillful preparation and
thorough consideration of all legislation? Query, whether it would not be
more helpful to have the aid of a well-prepared committee report on each
statute, indicating its nature and policy, and changes it will effectuate in ex-
isting law whether or not It is framed as an amendment.
24. Merrill, supra note 13, at 106-107. See also State ex rel. Normile v.
Cooney, 100 Mont. 391, 47 P.(2d) 637 (1935).
25. See Merrill, supra note 13, at 126: "unfortunately, the corpulence of
the statute-books, the catholicity of legislative activity, the inevitable inter-
jacence of all the human concerns of which the law and lawmaker take cog-
nizance, all combine to insure that very rarely is it possible to enact a statute
which does not, often in the' most unforeseen manner, impinge upon prior
legislation." See also Horack, supra note 9, at 307.
NOTES
tion of the express terms of the lease. At the time the action was
instituted, the lessee was in the army and sought a stay of pro-
ceedings under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940.1
Under Section 201 of the act, which gives the court wide discre-
tion in staying actions, the lower court granted the stay since,
in its view, the lease contract was ambiguous and the presence of
the lessee essential. The supreme court rested its reversal upon
the narrow ground that the terms were not ambiguous' and thus
afforded no basis for the stay. Tolmas v. Streiffer, 5 So. (2d) 372
(La. 1941).
This case presents one of the numerous problems affecting a
selectee's rights in civil actions. Protective legislation for the sol-
dier has long been the rule. In 1802 a federal statute was passed
prohibiting the arrest of any soldier for a debt of less than twenty
dollars contracted before enlistment, or for any debt contracted
after enlistment.8 Similar state legislation was passed during the
Mexican War.4 During World War I, in 1918, a Civil Relief Act
was passed. 5 The 1940 act, with few and minor exceptions, is
identical with the 1918 law; hence it is possible to analyze the
1940 legislation in light of the decisions interpreting the 1918 act.'
The purpose of the statute, briefly, is to suspend civil reme-
dies, in federal and state courts, against enlisted men where a
proper defense is hampered by military service, and to prevent
prejudice to their interests in all foreclosures, forfeitures, and
evictions previously pursued by summary proceedings.7 The court
1. 54 Stat. 1178 (1940), 50 U.S.C.A. App. §§ 501-585 (Supp. 1940).
2. It was clearly stated in the lease, "The lessee agrees that he will not
offer for sale shoes, children's wear, hardware, and furniture" on the leased
premises.
3. 2 Stat. 136 (1802), 10 U.S.C.A. § 610 (1928).
4. Texas Act of Jan. 22, 1836, Hart Dig. § 1267; Texas Act of Jan. 16,
1843, Hart Dig. § 1349.
During the Civil War the federal act protected all persons for acts done
under military authority [14 Stat. 46 (1866), 28 U.S.C.A. § 74 (1928)].
5. 40 Stat. 440 (1918), 50 U.S.C.A. § 178-186 (1928).
6. It has been consistently held that the 1918 Civil Relief Act Is consti-
tutional and that all similar state laws must yield to it. Pierrard v. Hoch,
97 Ore. 17, 191 Pac. 328 (1920); Konkel v. State, 168 Wis. 335, 170 N.W. 715
(1919). See also Comment (1940) 9 Int. Jurid. Ass'n Bull. 47.
7. "For the purpose of enabling the United States the more successfully
to prosecute and carry on the war in which it is at present engaged, pro-
tection Is hereby extended to persons In military service of the United States
in order to prevent prejudice or injury to their entire energy to the military
needs of the nation, and to this end the following provisions are made for
the temporary suspension of legal proceedings and transactions which may
prejudice the civil rights of persons in such service during the continuance of
the present war." 40 Stat. 440 (1918), 50 U.S.C.A. § 101 (Supp. 1941), made ap-
plicable by 54 Stat. 895 (1940), 50 U.S.C.A, § 313 (Supp. 1941) to persons in-
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has the discretionary power to order a stay or to suspend proceed-
ingss and, if the person in service, or someone on his behalf, re-
quests the stay, it must be granted unless the court feels that mili-
tary service has no material effect upon his ability to defend the
suit." The court is authorized to make any other ruling that will
fairly take care of the interests of all the parties involved.
Though the act operates broadly on all civil actions brought
against all persons in military service, there are certain provi-
sions in the act dealing with special actions.'" In Section 121 the
act provides relief from eviction of soldiers' or sailors' depend-
ents from a leased house occupied by them for dwelling pur-
poses;" but examination of the act reveals no provision at all for
business premises, which were involved in the principal case. It
has been suggested that the act is most inadequate on the subject
ducted under the Selective Training and Service Act, and to military person-
nel ordered to duty by 54 Stat. 860 (1940), 50 U.S.C.A. § 404 (Supp. 1941).
See Howie Mining Co. v. McGary, 256 Fed. 38 (C.C.A. 4th, 1919); Wood
v. Vogel, 204 Ala. 692, 87 So. 174 (1920); Halle v. Cavanaugh, 79 N.H. 418,
111 Atl. 76 (1920); In re Cool's Estate, 19 N.J. Misc. 236, 18 A.(2d) 714 (1941).
For good discussions of the act, see Bendetson, A Discussion of the Sol-
diers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 (1940) 2 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1;
Jenson, Civil Relief for Soldiers and Sailors: A Critical Analysis (1941) 36
Ill. L. Rev. 325; Muench, A Brief Analysis of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil
Relief Act from a Credit and Collection Viewpoint (1940) 46 Com. L. J. 36;
Wicker, A Synopsis of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act (1918) 4 Va.
L. Reg. (N.S.) 323; Comment (1941) 7 U. of Pitt. L. Rev. 300. For discussion
of the 1918 act by three of its draftsmen, see Ferry, Rosenbaum, and Wig-
more, The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Rights Bill (1918) 12 Ill. L. Rev. 449.
8. 54 Stat. 1181 (1940), 50 U.S.C.A. § 524 (Supp. 1941). See also Fennell v.
Frisch's Adm'r, 192 Ky. 535, 234 S.W. 198 (1921); Clark v. Klene, 201 Mo. App.
408, 212 S.W. 55 (1919); Gilluly v. Hawkins, 108 Wash. 79, 182 Pac. 958 (1919).
9. Fennell v. Frisch's Adm'r, 192 Ky. 535, 234 S.W. 198 (1921) (defendant's
duties were such as to allow him to spend a part of his time at home and the
judge refused to grant stay on grounds that defendant was in military serv-
ice); White v. Kimerer, 83 Okla. 9, 200 Pac. 430 (1921) (lower court was held
to have properly exercised its discretion in refusing continuance on grounds
of one of defendants being in military service); Ilderton v. Charleston
Consol. Ry., 113 S.C. 91, 101 S.E. 282 (1919) (error to refuse stay where only wit-
ness for defendant was suddenly sent to France before his deposition could
be taken). See also Clark v. Klene, 201 Mo. App. 408, 212 S.W. 55 (1919);
Post v. Thomas, 183 App. Div. 525, 170 N.Y. Supp. 227 (1918); Dietz v. Treupel,
184 App. Div. 448, 170 N.Y. Supp. 108 (1918); Korsch v. Lambing, 28 N.Y.
S.(2d) 167 (1941).
10. 54 Stat. 1178 (1940), 50 U.S.C.A. App. §§ 501-585 (Supp. 1941). Article
III deals with rent, installment contracts, and mortgages; Article IV deals
with insurance; Article V deals with taxes and public lands.
11. It provides that in all leased dwellings where the rent is not above
$80 per month and is occupied by dependents, the occupants shall not be
evicted except upon court order. At its own discretion the court may order
stay for not longer than three months or make such order as may be just.
Anyone evicting in violation of this provision will be guilty of a misde-
meanor and punishable by imprisonment not to exceed one year or by fine
not to exceed $1,000, or both. An allotment of a reasonable portion of the
soldier's pay may be made to partially meet the rent. 54 Stat. 1181 (1940), 50
U.S.C.A. § 524 (Supp. 1941).
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of rents12 and that there should be a specific provision for com-
mercial lessees. 8
In the principal case, after declaring the lease contract in fact
unambiguous, the court correctly held that no stay should be
granted when the unequivocal terms of a commercial lease have
been broken, as the defendant's presence at the action for evic-
tion is not essential.
Although there are a few weaknesses in the act, such as the
provision on rents, it does, nevertheless, provide security for men
in military service who might otherwise, by reason of their serv-
ice, be subjected to injustice and oppression in civil actions.
W.F.M.M., JR.
TORTS-INDEMNIFICATION OF JOINT TORTFEASOR CONSTRUCTIVELY
LIABLE-CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY BETWEEN JOINT TORTFEASORS
-Due solely to the negligence of the defendant's agent in install-
ing a gas stove sold by the plaintiff's indemnitees, the stove ex-
ploded. In an action for personal injuries sustained as a result of
the explosion, solidary judgment had been rendered against the
defendant and the plaintiff's indemnitee. Plaintiff, as indemnitor,
paid one-half the judgment, and, being subrogated to the indem-
nitee's rights against the joint tortfeasor, seeks restitution. The
defendant argued that the judgment rendered against the plain-
tiff's indemnitee as a joint tortfeasorl precluded the plaintiff from
showing mere technical liability and recovering the amount paid
12. See Comment (1940) 9 Int. Jurid. Ass'n Bull. 46, 50.
13. Ibid. The English act confers no special privileges upon members of
the armed forces as such but applies generally to all persons, including alien
enemies. Courts (Emergency Powers) Act, 2 & 3 Geo. VI, c. 67 (1939), as
amended by 3 & 4 Geo. VI, c. 37 (1940). Under this act the principle is not
established in England that any tenant or mortgagor is entitled to have his
ability to pay any particular installment determined by reference to his
means at the time it is due. See Comment (1940) 9 Int. Jurid. Ass'n Bull. 46,
50, n. 66; 33 Halsbury's Statutes of England (1940) 547.
1. The term "tortfeasor" is used to describe one who, for any reason, is
subject to liability in a delictual action. The word "tort" carries with it,
however, the suggestion of wrong-doing. Since in many cases tort liability is
imposed on a party where the actual conduct which subjects him to liability
is not his own, it is unfortunate that the same broad term is applied to him
as to one actually guilty of reprehensible conduct. Bohlen, Contribution and
Indemnity Between Tortfeasors (1936) 21 Corn. L. Q. 552. See also Leflar,
Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors (1932) 81 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
130. Louisiana, however, has adopted, together with common law tort rules,
common law term "tort" in the place of the civil law "delict" and "quasi
delict."
